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 The paper analyzes the general structure and coherence of the his-
torical consciousness of young people in five clusters of European 
countries, using the results of the international study Youth and His-
tory of 1995. The analysis suggests there are two main patterns of 
historical thinking and the construction of historico-political identity 
that the author calls works of historical progressivism and the forge of 
patriotism. These modernist schemes of thought, grounded in the 
conflicting perceptions of the nation, democracy and Europe, make 
historical consciousness ambivalent. The coherence of historical con-
sciousness is somewhat lower in the countries of Eastern Europe, 
which can be explained by the impact of the “neuralgias” of the col-
lapse of socialism and the discontinuity in social, political and cul-
tural spheres as expressed in the ideological cleavages of that time. In 
the postsocialist Central-European countries on the other hand, this 
coherence is the highest, the fact that the author attributes to the radi-
cal shift from the ideology of socialism and the domination of the 
cleavage traditionalism-occidentalism. 
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Introduction 
 In the semantic confusion of the technologized civilisation (see Kemper, 
1993: 7) which can be likened to an accelerating carrousel there has been a 
tendency of “turning away from the stable and ‘hard’ history in favour of the 
shifting and ‘soft’ memory (ethnic, social, group, class, racial, gender, per-
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sonal and others)” (Ugrešić, 2002: 278) i.e. the assumption about the unten-
ability of history in the traditional realistic sense (Munslow, 1997: 16). 
There are only representations in and about the past, and nobody can claim 
they know the past as it really was. Each historical notion is conditioned by 
historians’ attitudes and is relative (Cipek, 1995: 183). Although there is a 
civilisational bias towards the so-called reality effect, knowledge (or repre-
sentation) and reality (or the represented) will always differ (cf. Ankersmit, 
2001: 280). Despite the fact that history, as being grounded in the uncontest-
able notions of truth, objectivity, and referentiality,1 is challenged, it can re-
fer to the new and more challenging questions about how we gain knowl-
edge about the past. That is why we find acceptable the notion of history as 
cultural practice i.e. self-conscious narrative composition written in the here 
and now that recognizes its literary form, not merely as its mode of report 
but as its essential cognitive medium (see Munslow, 1997: 164). In the very 
least, history is structured by its form as much as by its content. In historical 
understanding, “the compulsion of experience” plays as big a role as “the 
compulsion of language” (Rorty, 1967 in Ankersmit, 2001: 32). 
 The starting point of this paper is the assumption of the plurality of his-
tory stemming from the unavoidable fictionality of narration,2 which to a 
large degree depends on the changeable standards of “interpretative commu-
nities” i.e. of professional historians and official interpretations of the past 
that shape basic perceptions about the identities of political communities 
(e.g. from constitutional preambles to textbooks).3 In that context we can ask 
ourselves what the various effects of historical representations on general 
population and its internal segments are i.e. their constitutive and formative 
influences on historical consciousness as a part of a culture of populus. Sim-
ply said, the multiplicity of meanings of historical texts should be manifested 
in the variability of historical consciousness. Historical consciousness as a 
concept is not limited to the past’s temporal dimension (through which the 
history conceives itself) but also to the present (in which and for which his-
tory is always written) and to the future (in which history puts hopes of its 
 
1 A term used to designate a general belief in the largely unproblematic or adequate match 
between reality (event, person, thing, process) and its description (linguistic expression) (Mun-
slow, 1997: 188).  
2 Although historical argumentation must be exposed to intersubjective inquiry and to criti-
cal challenges to its validity, it is invariably a result of a memory on the one hand, while on the 
other its viability depends more on the impression it leaves on readers than on any correspo-
spondence with past events (see Biti, 20001: 404). “Historical truth” ia s construct stemming 
from the correspondence of an account with the expectations of the reading public. This high-
lights the question of how much such an intersubjectively verified discourse of the historical 
community with its alleged reasonableness genuinely does away with the myths, prejudices, and 
manipulations of everyday “life-world” histories (see Biti, 1000b: 12). 
3 On the analysis of history textbooks, see more in Cipek (1995) and Baranović (1999). 
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own validation). Thus defined research subject encompasses cultural mem-
ory, values and political attitudes, and socio-political expectations in the 
studied societies. 
 One of the fundamental questions in studying historical consciousness is 
what kind of a picture of the general structure and the organization of indi-
vidual dimensions of thus defined (and surveyed) historical consciousness 
can be represented. We will try to give an answer to this by analyzing the re-
sults of the international study “Youth and History” conducted in 1995,4 fo-
cusing on both the common and the specific aspects of different European 
regions. Particular attention will be paid to the analysis of the differences 
between the European East and West caused by the “neuralgies” of the re-
cent collapse of the socialist system i.e. the differences in the internal coher-
ence of historical thinking both in the regions that have undergone radical 
changes and in those that have had a legacy of social, political, and cultural 
continuity. 
 Before we start analyizing the mentioned problems, let us define the con-
cept of historical consciousness and the one possible matrix of its produc-
tion. 
 
Historical consciousness: the concept 
 Various authors agree that historical consciousness can be defined as a 
complex connectedness of the interpretations of the past, the perceptions of 
the present, and the expectations in the future concerning giving meaning to 
the experience in time and to the experience of change in narrative structure 
(Jeismann, 1985, 1988; Rüsen, 1989, 1994; in Angvik and Borries, 1997a: 
36).  
 Before it was used in the deliberations about historico-political education 
(see Jeismann, 1988, 1992), and in the research about the effects of his-
torico-political socialization (Borries, 1991; Borries/Angvik, 1994; Ang-
vik/Borries, 1997), the concept of historical consciousness had been used in 
historiography. Its purpose was to identify the features of historical thinking 
and the knowledge of individual epochs, cultures, historians, etc. i.e. to de-
velop an awareness of those features of historical thinking that belong to the 
realm of unquestionable norms, paradigms, or projections into other cultures 
in order to, according to Jörn Rüsen, “prevent or correct any hidden cultural 
 
4 More than 32,000 15-year-olds took part in the research. The study’s purpose was to ana-
lyze the orientations of teenagers to history as a school subject and the content of their historical 
consciousness. The managers were Magne Angvik (Bergen College, Norway) and Bodo von 
Borries (Hamburg Universität, Germany). In Croatia the coordinator was Professor Ivan Šiber 
(University of Zagreb). 
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imperialism or misleading perspective in comparative scholarship” (1996: 
8).  
 The central element of historical consciousness is the way of making 
sense of history which is defining for the logic of historical interpretation, 
the poetics and the rhetoric of the shaping of representations and the possi-
bility of understanding the past as something relevant and significant for the 
present-day orientation of a culture (ibid.). This is a kind of an “orientational 
symbolism” (Chang, 1987: 7) or the “general interpretation of life and 
world” that would allegedly more or less enable to the people to “maintain 
coherence and order in the universe of meaning”. When history is con-
cerned, the fundamental process of making sense of history is manifested in 
the concepts of time and temporal change that define the relationship be-
tween past, present and future. There are two basic functions of the thus de-
fined historical consciousness: the temporal life orientation and the creation 
of historical identity (see Rüsen, 2001: 7); in other words, the production of 
historical culture. In this, the leading role in shaping historical thinking 
would belong to historiography whose task would be the integration of posi-
tive facts and principles of temporal order (cf. Rüsen, 1996: 20) in the inter-
action with the other relevant actors. Thus created historical consciousness 
can be graphically shown by means of Jörn Rüsen’s disciplinary matrix.  
 
Disciplinary matrix of historical consciousness 
 Jörn Rüsen thinks that academic history is closely related to the ways in 
which we live our everyday life (cf. Lee, 2002: 3), but their relation is not a 
simple, one-sided one in which academic history informs and guides every-
day experience. Human interests and the corresponding need for orientation 
in time make history develop theories on how the world functions. All this, 
in conjunction with the existing methodological rules and practices, struc-
tures the forms of historical representation. This output from the discipline 
leads back into the world of everyday life by fulfiling, more or less success-
fully, the function of orientation in time. This would be the shortest possible 
description of Rüsen’s disciplinary matrix shown in the form of a diagram 
(Picture 1). 
 Rüsen uses the disciplinary matrix concept in answering the questions of 
how and why the changes in the paradigms of the discipline of history occur 
and to explain the ways in which, despite such changes, history manages to 
get across as a rational approach to the past. The matrix suggests that the 
paradigm change is the result of the change in the world of practical life that 
generates a new (cognitive) interest and offers some new possibilities for 
orientation. However, the changes in the world “below the line” are a neces-
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sary but not the sufficient condition for the paradigm change. The change is 













Picture 1. Jörn Rüsen’s disciplinary matrix (taken from Lee, 2002: 3) 
 
 Rüsen’s matrix implies equal influence i.e. “referring” practical life to 
the discipline of history and vice versa. Nevertheless, from the aspect of the 
discipline this referral is no mere response to the demands of everyday life 
e.g. concerning the preservation of national identity. Academic history “pro-
duces theoretical surplus beyond the need for identity of acting subjects” 
which “ought to be seen as the distinctive rational achievement of research-
oriented historical narrative” (Rüsen, 1990, in Megill, 1994: 51). Besides, 
history “transcends the particularity of the ‘commonsensical’ orientation of 
action within the life-world” (ibid.). History itself is a historical achievement 
with its own methodological rules and practices, guided by theory, and can 
thereby adopt a critical stance towards the interests and demands of leben-
spraxis (cf. Lee, 2002: 4). 
 Such a definition of the disciplinary matrix, however, leaves out from the 
disciplinary aspect (i.e. “above the line”) at least two elements. These are the 
theories from social sciences applied in historical interpretations (e.g. theory 
of modernization) that together with the above mentioned make up the body 
of the theories on historical past, while the second element would be the 
metatheories (Rüsen’s or the one by Hayden White /1973/), i.e. the theories 
on the discipline of history. Besides, in the original or “autochthonous” 
genesis of theoretical concepts, the author very generally defines them as the 
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“leading views of experience”, which seems understandable having in mind 
the dominant mood in the historical guild – the contextualist antitheoretical 
orientation. However, even in such interpretations of historical past it is pos-
sible to glean the implicit theories. 
 Thus understood, all the three theoretical positions (at least as an attempt 
at pooling them in a common epistemological field) might be identified with 
Munslow’s (1997) definition of major approaches to historical knowledge.5 
Rüsen’s definition of the matrix would best correspond to what Munslow 
calls the reconstructionist view of history with which Rüsen shares the belief 
in the classical enlightening role of history and the belief in the existence of 
single history, at least as a justification of the discipline (Megill, 1994: 54), 
that follows the “road” of approximate universal validity. The construction-
ist view would be the one that “borrows” the explicit theories from social 
sciences for historical interpretation, most often for the so-called compre-
hensive explanations (e.g. the Marxist school). The metaposition, dealing 
with the forms of creating historical knowledge, the relationship between the 
form and the content, the ideological elements of theories, the relativity of 
historical accounts, the problems of fundamental undecidability, etc. would 
fall under deconstructionism. 
 Let us now turn to the life “below the line” and look into people’s tempo-
ral orientation that is usually seen as given and necessary, i.e. as the orienta-
tion that is not open to the possibility of choice. However, the question is 
what is the relevant temporal orientation? Must this orientation necessarily 
include the past that transcends personal memory i.e. can only history pro-
vide people with temporal orientation? Lee (2002: 5-7) thinks that in practi-
cal life there are the orientations that “pay no attention to history”. This does 
not mean that such orientations are completely detached from the narratives 
that history enables, but that they significantly differ from those that derive 
from the discourse of the methodologically explicit historical research. 
These orientations stem from the so-called practical pasts (Oakeshott in Lee, 
2002: 6), that can assume different forms, depending on the “way of under-
standing”; for example “popular memories”, legal comments of the past, 
administrative investigations, propaganda, etc. Such pasts are most often 
represented as “commonsensical” constructs, and in this attribute they are 
agile in demanding the status of truthfulness. However, professional history 
in itself is often a prisoner of the construct of truthfulness, and is often 
promulgated as “what happened in the past”, and not as “what can be said 
about the past”. 
 
5 The reconstructionist, constructionist and deconstructionist views of historical knowledge.  
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 As the conclusion of the above thoughts on the disciplinary matrix of his-
torical consciousness “above” and “below the line”6 it is possible to elabo-















Picture 2. The modified disciplinary matrix of historical consciousness 
 
 So far we have tried to show the structure of the production space of his-
torical consciousness; now let us focus on one of the elements of that space – 
the existential orientation in time i.e. the effects of the discipline on the un-
derstanding of its representations. The data base will be the research of his-
torical consciousness of young people in Europe carried out in 1995. 
 
Aims of the research 
 The first aim is to lay out the general structure and connectedness of indi-
vidual dimensions of historical consciousness by analyzing the partial cor-
relations of five clusters of European countries calculated in the original 
 
6 The elements of the practical pasts in the matrix are taken from Lee (2002: 6). 
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study7 (see Angvik and Borries: A50). Our intention is to show the 
characteristic features of historical thinking in Europe at the turn of the mil-
lennium i.e. the basic mechanisms of the production of the orientation in 
time by means of history. 
 Our second aim is to try to identify the differences in the coherence of 
historical thinking between the Easteuropean and the Westeuropean coun-
tries i.e. the transitional countries in which socialism recently collapsed as 
opposed to the regions with a somewhat longer legacy of social, political, 
and cultural continuity. The assumption is that due to the positive effect of 
the democratic tradition and the more enduring stable role of historico-po-
litical socialization, in Westeuropean countries historical consciousness will 
in general be more coherent. 
 
Method 
 The field work for the research of the major international comparative 
study “Youth and History” was carried out in 30 countries during 1995.8 In 
Croatia it lasted from 6 February to 16 March. The participation was com-
pletely anonymous, both at the level of schools and individual pupils. In 
Croatia, out of 1,027 pupils only two refused to take part. During two school 
lessons, the pupils (in front of the coordinator and the classroom teacher) re-
plied to the questionnaire that had 281 variables at the manifest level.9  
 
7 There were separate analyses for the “Nordic countries” (Denmark, Sweden, Norway, 
Finland, and Iceland), the “Western Central Europe” (Great Britain, France, Germany, Belgium, 
and Italy), the “South Europe” (Portugal, Spain and Greece), the “Eastern Central Europe” 
(Slovenia, Croatia, Hungary, Czech Republic, and Poland), and the “Eastern Europe” (Bulgaria, 
Estonia, Lithuania, Russia, and Ukraine). Apart from allowing the highlighting of the results 
characteristic for individual regions (clusters), this kind of analysis enables a very simple com-
parison and identification of the common features of historical consciousness. 
8 Some may perhaps find the recency of this research questionable as it was conducted ten 
years ago. However, this should not be a problem since on the one hand we are dealing with the 
basic mechanisms of historical orientation which, it is assumed, are not the attributes of only 
one generation but are relatively stable cultural features. Hence the analyzed dispositions will be 
exclusively at the level of the so-called second-order factors. On the other hand, although there 
have been some smaller or bigger changes in the contents of the secondary school history in the 
studied countries, the basic form of representation and teaching of history has remained the 
same. Also, our measurement instruments registered the general contents characteristic for en-
tire Europe. That is why we think that what after these ten years characterizes most of those 
participants is only a bigger experience in using general patterns of historical thinking that will 
be outlined later; the relationship among individual elements of these patterns might have be-
come stronger or weaker. We believe that there have been no crucial restructurings.  
9 The questionnaire (in English) can be found in Angvik and Borries, 1997 (pp. A442-
A468); its Croatian version, slightly modified, can be found in Blanuša, 2004 (pp. 159-174). For 
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 The target population were the first-year high-schoolers, mostly 15-year-
olds. The theoretical reason for choosing this population was that political 
attitudes and views of history have developed to a certain degree at that age 
(Angvik and Borries, 1997: A27); also, this age bracket “optimally repro-
duces the existing social consciousness” (Šiber, 1996: 113).10  
 The total European sample included more than 32,000 respondents, rang-
ing from 829 (Sweden) to 2,107 (Germany), stratified for each country in 
line with the country’s educational system and the populations’ heterogene-
ity11 for the sake of the biggest possible representativeness. Where possible, 
an ample number of members of ethnic-linguistic minorities was included 
for more “serious” statistical analyses.12  
 Due to the complexity of the studied phenomenon and a large number of 
the variables, we have analyzed the partial correlations only for the second-
order factors, previously calculated by factor analysis. The dimension “per-
ceptions of the present”13 included the value orientations of cultural 
protectivism (named as conventional pragmatism in the original study), fun-
damental altruism, traditional nationalism (authoritarian traditionalism in the 
original study) and the values of privacy and materialism (materialist priva-
tism in the original study).14 The dimension the “interpretation of the past” 
 
more details on the operationalization of the used model of historical consciousness, see in 
Blanuša 2002 and 2004. 
10 The basic assumption of the research of this age group is that their opinion is the “soci-
ety’s mirror”; the question, however, is to what degree views and attitudes at that age are inte-
grated into the value system and to what extent they express and justify certain political views. 
Accordingly, it is assumed that older generations should manifest a deeper integration of his-
torical interpretations and values. 
11 E.g. in Italy, besides the basic sample a special sample was used in south Tyrol for the 
three linguistic-ethnic groups. 
12 The reason for this special interest in minorities lies is the distinctiveness of their social 
legacy in relation to the majority population and the possible differences in the significance of 
the same past events, which can often be conducive to the conflicting perceptions of the present 
and the perspective of the future. About this topic in Croatia, see e.g. Blanuša, 2002. 
13 See the basic definition of historical consciousness on page 2. 
14 These four value orientations make the so-called synchronic foothold of culture i.e. the 
basic criterion for present perceptions. Each of them is further made up from the following val-
ues and judgements expressed as the first-order factors: cultural protectivism (importance of 
preservation of old monuments and rare, justifying hypothetical annexation by ethnic identity 
and international consensus, willingness to grant civil rights to assimilated, loyal immigrants, 
voting in favour of solving environmental and women’s issues, favouring colonial reparations 
according to the principle of guilt/compensation, and importance of solidarity), fundamental al-
truism (colonial reparations according to the principles of wealth and solidarity, civil rights for 
all imigrants, importance of solidarity, and voting in favour of internationale conomic aid to less 
developed countries), traditional nationalism (ethnocentric values, obedience to enforced mar-
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included the positive and the negative associations to historical periods,15 
and the dimension “the expectations from the future” the following three 
factors: personal and social optimism, general expectation of conflict, and 
wish for political participation. Also included among the temporally integra-
tive perceptions are the associations to the identifying constructs of history: 
nation, democracy, and Europe.16 In each analysis and picture, we have in-
cluded as relevant all the correlations above 0.15.17 
 
The results 
 The results of the five discrete analyses for each cluster of the countries 
are shown on the following diagrams, starting with the Nordic countries; the 
Westeuropean diagram follows and then the Southeuropean cluster; the last 
two pictures refer to the clusters of Centraleuropean and Easteuropean 
countries i.e. post-socialist states. In each picture the dimension of the pre-
sent (i.e. value orientations) is on the top; on the left is the dimension of the 
past (i.e. associations to historical periods); and on the right are the expecta-
tions of the future; in the middle are the integrative associations to historico-
political constructs. 
 
riage, justification of a hypothetical military aggression with dominant position and violence, 
and importance of preserving modern monuments), privacy and materialism (the importance of 
privacy and family life, of money and wealth, and merited wealth as reward for hard work). 
15 The first-order factors that make up the negative perceptions are: The Middle Ages as a 
period of oppression and conflict, Colonization as a period of exploitation and Industrial revo-
lution as an deterioration of the society and the nature.The positive perceptions are made up of: 
The Middle Ages as a glorious period, Colonization as a period of adventure and Industrial 
revolution as material progress.  
16 These are two second-order factors. One refers to the affirmation of identifying con-
structs i.e. positive association to nation, democracy, and Europe, while the second factor in-
cludes, besides detachment from democracy and Europe also the organismic understanding of 
the nation. In the first factor the positive attitude to the nation was expressed in the acceptance 
of the “classical” definitions of the nation by means of common origin, culture as well as the 
willingness of its members to shape a common future. This combination of the Herderian and 
the Renanian definition in this factor in all the studied countries the authors explain as the result 
of the sedimentation of their significance due to their enduring presence in the public discourse, 
the reason why young people consider them as obvious. 
17 Although the question of the level of the so-called substantitality of correlations is arbi-
trary, usually those above the range of 0.20-0.30 come into this category. That is why our 
threshhold of 0.15 might be considered to be too low. It has been chosen, as has been already 
mentioned in footnote 9, due to a weaker general integration of historical consciousness of that 
age group, so that even somewhat lower correlations were taken as the “trace” of the thinking 
that in the future might become “deeper imprinted”. Also, these are partial correlations, as a rule 
lower than the “regular”, bivariate correlations, to which the mentioned range criterion is 
applied most often.  
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General structure of historical consciousness and regional 
particularities 
 By comparing the accounts of the “regional” structures of historical con-
sciousness, the common – the so-called core triad of positively related ele-
ments – may be identified: negative associations to periods, cultural protec-
tivism and affirmative association to identifying constructs of history. This is 
an approach that might, if channelled towards the critical awareness of 
shortcomings, mistakes or injustices in the past, help to rectify them and pre-
serve and affirm various communities, identities and rights, within the politi-
cal frameworks of the conventionally defined nation, the democratic system 
and the broader and integrative European space. Also, cultural protectivism 
as a value base of this kind of thinking in all groups rejects detachment and 
scepticism to democracy and Europe, as well as the organismic concept of 
the nation. The described historical opinion probably holds those constructs 
as unquestionably positive values in themselves and represents its conven-
tional aspect.18 Also, the more affirmative the association to historico-politi-
cal constructs, the more pronounced and positive the expectation of the fu-
ture, both at the personal as well as on the broader social level of prosperity. 
Having all this in mind, such an optimistic pattern of historical thinking may 
be understood as the foundation for a type of critical intellectual skills in 
historical judgement. Of course, these relations imply the opposite pole of 
this thinking which would probably reject history and its constructs and be 
historically uninformed and unmotivated19 – in a word presentist – and 
would include pessimistic and catastrophic expectations of the future. 
 Taken altogether, this pattern of historical thinking is obviously modern-
ist and as such reflects the faith in progress and the enlightenment’s opti-
mism and efforts to overcome the constraints of the past hampering progress. 
This thinking implies the possibility of moral emancipation by means of 
“learning on historical mistakes”. That is why it can be considered as the 
works of historical progressivism. Of course, this is not materialistic pro-
gressivism,20 but a pattern of thinking whose criteria of the desirability of ex-
 
18 It would be interesting to see whether the bigger immediate experience with the analyzed 
constructs changes these “idealist” attitudes.  
19 At the level of individual samples the general motivation for history is related to cultural 
protectivism at the level of 0.20 to 0.30, while the negative associations to historical epochs 
range from 0.14 to 0.21, except for Eastern Europe (0.09), where the coherence is generally 
lower. The element of motivation to history is not included in the diagrams not to complicate 
them too much.  
20 The relation between the value of privacy and materialism and personal and social opti-
mism appears in four out of five clusters (see Pictures 3-7) and which, expectedly, does not 
show any relation to historical past.  
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istence and action are similar to – otherwise called – postmaterialist values, 
are integrated into the metanarrative on continued enlightenment. 
 In all the clusters there is also the relation between the general motiva-
tion to history (see footnote 19) and traditional nationalism. While in the 
north of Europe traditional nationalism remains – just like fundamental al-
truism – isolated from other elements of historical consciousness, it is related 
in all other groups to the detachment from the identifying constructs of his-
tory and to the organismic concept of the nation. Concerning the attitude to 
the identifying constructs, the higher prominence of nationalist tendencies 
includes the propensity towards the suspension of democratic values and the 
scepticism towards the European integration, as an expression of the need 
for internal homogenization and the “unequivocal” attitude to the Others. 
The factor of the organismic understanding of the nation contained the 
opinion based on the definition of how nations emerge and grow but also 
how they come to ruin just like everything else; in order to survive they have 
the right fight for their own state. Nevertheless, when trying to save them-
selves i.e. to stop destroying each other, it is desirable for the nation-states to 
give up on part of their sovereignty in favour of a supranational organiza-
tion.21 Its link with the factor of traditional nationalism (see its description in 
footnote 14) is expected and understandable. 
 In the Westeuropean cluster traditional nationalism is also related to the 
positive associations to historical periods i.e to the “glorious past” by which 
nationalist ideologies lay claim to the attribute of ancientness,22 but it seems 
that such an idealistic support of nationalism does not exist in the other 
clusters, not even in the south of Europe, where their pre-national pasts 
might serve for the same purpose.  
 The clusters of south, central and eastern Europe have another thing in 
common besides nationalism: the influence of fundamental altruism on the 
detachment from the identifying constructs of history. This relation might be 
a consequence of the experience with the totalitarian and unstable situations 
characterizing those countries’ recent past, in which the preoccupation with 
it and the existing political relationships through fundamental altruism pro-
duces a kind of antipolitics of unconditional solidarity, realized in the format 
of the organismic notion of the nation. 
 
21 Such an opinion might represent a Hobbesian variation of social contract applied to 
supranational unification, the reason for which may be justified only when starting from the 
negative state of existential threat. In its extreme form, this conservative opinion may be for-
mulated in the following way: “Unless survival is at stake, it is better to preserve the status quo 
as we do not know whether we are going to be be better off united.” 
22 It is interesting how traditional nationalism in that cluster was most related to the associa-
tion to the Middle Ages as a glorious period (r = 0.15).  
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 And finally the postsocialist countries in which, apart from the above, 
traditional nationalism is related to the preference of the immediate to the 
distant future,23 which means the past of their own emancipation from 
communism, most probably the cornerstone of the perception of one’s own 
importance. Besides, only in central Europe there is also the supporting rela-
tion of nationalism to the affirmation of historical constructs, which un-
doubtedly has something to do with the basic liberalizational-democratic 
orientation of the national movements of these countries in the early 1990s. 
 The analyzed set of the elements of historical consciousness surrounding 
the motivation for history, traditional nationalism, the organismic under-
standing of the nation, and the detachment from the other constructs of his-
tory structuring with the other elements in line with the regional-specific 
perceptions of one’s own status in the past, we call the forge of patriotism. 
That is the part of historical thinking within which the loyalty to a national 
community is socialized, the community seen in the organismic, integrative 
way, namely as the one that “…extends back into history and forward into 
the future through inter-generational solidarity.” (March in Pusić, 1997: 
105).  
 Let us now turn to the other elements of historical consciousness. Out of 
the plethora of elements of the associations to future, the element most re-
lated to the others is personal and social optimism that is mostly supported 
by the above mentioned values of privacy and materialism, and the associa-
tions to historical constructs. While in the European north and west there is a 
steady and opposing influence of the affirmative and the detached relation to 
historical constructs, in the other clusters the dissatisfaction with them has 
no consequences for the expectations of accomplishment and wealth on the 
personal, national and European level. On the other hand, it seems that the 
expectation of social problems and conflicts is affected by the dissatisfaction 
with constructs or/and cultural protectivism. In the latter case, this might 
mean that the readiness for the protection of identity and rights, as well as 
for the preservation of historical and natural landmarks partly includes the 
expectations of an increasing significance of these issues in the future, and 
the possible future conflicts. Besides, it seems that in post-socialist countries 
the expectations of future conflicts are affected by the perceptions of nega-
tive past events, which might be an indication of their perceptual prominence 
i.e. visibility and remembrance, depending on the level of turmoils in their 
societies.  
 
23 That factor is also not represented in Pictures 3-7 as it would only complicate the dia-
gram and make it “illegible”. The partial correlations to traditional nationalism for Central 
Europe are r = 0.23 and r = 0.21 for Eastern Europe.  
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 Unlike the previous two elements of expectations, the wish for political 
participation remains in three clusters a completely isolated element of his-
torical consciousness. While its absence in the Easteuropean and Centraleu-
ropean clusters comes as no surprise due to the social legacy of an authori-
tarian culture of political conformism and passivity, this result in the 
Westeuropean cluster is totally unexpected. Even the Nordic countries do 
not stand out in the integration of this element into the other aspects of his-
torical consciousness; only critical thinking about the negative aspects of 
historical periods galvanizes young people to political participation and con-
sequently to their involvement. In Europe’s south, on the other hand, the 
participation in political activities and in exercising political freedoms, as 
well as social optimism, are supported by more pronounced nationalist ten-
dencies. It seems that in this orientation of political consciousness 15-year-
olds are still not experienced enough and involved enough to be able to re-
spond more. 
 
Coherence of historical consciousness in different parts of 
Europe 
 In order to determine the general level of internal coherence of historical 
consciousness of individual clusters, three indicators may be used: the total 
number of substantial correlations, their average value, and the number of 
the isolated elements of historical consciousness. The results are listed in 
Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Indicators of internal coherence of historical consciousness of five 
clusters of European countries 
 Number of 
correlations 




Central Europe 13 0.21 1 
Western Europe 11 0.22 2 
Southern Europe 11 0.22 2 
Nordic countries 11 0.20 2 
Eastern Europe 10 0.19 2 
 
 The obtained results only partly confirm the original assumptions that the 
post-socialist cluster will demonstrate a generally lower coherence than the 
countries with a longer social, political and cultural continuity. While the 
differences among the average values of the correlations are not big, the 
other indicators clearly point to the conclusion that the highest coherence of 
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historical consciousness can be found in the Centraleuropean cluster, and the 
lowest coherence in the Easteuropean countries. How to explain this? 
 The reason for a higher coherence of historical consciousness of young 
people from the Centraleuropean postsocialist countries in relation to the 
young people from Eastern Europe can be found in the difference among the 
dominant ideological cleavages in these countries in the early 1990s. The 
typical polarization pattern for the Centraleuropean countries, both for the 
old and the new states, was traditionalism-occidentalism (cf. Kasapović, 
1996: 145-7), and for the Easteuropean countries the dominant and enduring 
cleavage was prosocialism-antisocialism. It seems that within the first 
framework primarily the identifying historical constructs had a bigger sig-
nificance for both cleavage poles,24 a manifestation of a more radical detach-
ment from the ideology of socialism;25 this ideology in the countries of East-
ern Europe was a powerful or even dominant alternative. Because of this a 
bigger coherence was primarily manifested in that part of historical thinking 
which we hold responsible for the socialization of loyalty to the national 
community. This does not refer only to the part that defines the nation or-
ganismically and establishes it by juxtaposing it to other forms and aspects 
of political existence, but also to its concept as a culturo-historical achieve-
ment, together with democracy and Europe, related both to the critical and 
the positive association to historical periods as well as another expression of 
national self-awareness. 
 In comparison with the other clusters in which the established socializa-
tional patterns have been reproduced for some time, which means that their 
contents to a large degree have obtained the status of truisms, in the Cen-
traleuropean cluster, probably due to the then current motivation for the 
clearest possible self-definition of identity, these patterns of understanding 
play a more significant role in historical consciousness, and are hence ex-
pressed in higher correlations. 
 
Conclusion 
 This paper suggests there is the general correspondence in the forms of 
historical thinking of young people from countries with different historical 
legacies, starting from the common elements and the patterns of relation-
 
24 Liberal democracy would be a value in its own right, Europe the central element of occi-
dentalism, and the nation the axis of traditionalism. 
25 Although in the Centraleuropean countries the polarization pattern socialism-antisocial-
ism has not been “extinguished” entirely, as proved by (according to Kasapović, 1996: 147) the 
return of the left to power in Poland (1993) and Hungary (1994), as well as its renaissance in 
Czech Republic (1996).  
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ships among them – provided, of course, that such thinking is not solely the 
consequence of the used methodology oriented towards the general historical 
content of the European continent, at the level on which national particulari-
ties were not included. However, the results have shown enough interesting 
differences which we have tried to explain contextually and by referring to 
some more fundamental historical processes. The analyzed relations are sto-
chastic and moderate, not complete. Let the readers decide on the impression 
regarding the (un)correspondence of expectations. 
 We claim that the two general patterns of historical thinking – the works 
of historical progressivism and the forge of patriotism – are the basic 
mechanisms of the production of historical subject i.e. its identity. In both 
mechanisms the attempt at taking on an identity is by forming a certain per-
ception of the Other, the different, including the detachment from that dif-
ferent Other, together with the identification with certain values and specific 
definitions of historico-political constructs. Regarding progressivism, the 
Other belongs to past epochs and times (see footnote 14) which are labelled 
as outmoded and morally inappropriate, while regarding patriotism the Other 
is branded by the ethnic, cultural and territorial distinctiveness which gains 
the temporal dimension by being integrated into the image of nations as 
bodies i.e. social organisms that constantly and evenly make their way 
through history (cf. Anderson, 1990: 33). In the first case the past is meas-
ured by the standards of the present that serve to the projection of the ideal 
of existence in the future, and in the second the present is designated on the 
basis of an imaginary past for the sake of a sense of continuity that creates a 
feeling of security and alleviates the anxiety of individual existence. The 
scheme of historical progressivism thus serves to the idea of civilizational 
progress, while the scheme of patriotism serves to the self-definition of dis-
tinctiveness, sufficiency and/or even superiority in relation to others, par-
ticularly in the situations of perceived threats. 
 However, these two coexisting schemes of identification include com-
pletely opposing perceptions of the nation, democracy and Europe. In short, 
while the scheme of progressivism includes the correspondence of these 
three historico-political constructs, in the scheme of patriotism there is a 
certain “entrenchment” concerning the idea of the nation as opposed to the 
other constructs. These schemes make historical consciousness inherently 
ambivalent and historical identity divided between the demand of the “Rea-
son” and the expectations of the “Loyalty”,26 between what history shows as 
 
26 Although demand and expectation imply some external influence, they can be understood 
also as the internalized, subjectively perceived internal motivations to adopt the mentioned 
forms of thinking and behaving. 
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universal achievement27 and the particular legacy and features of one’s own 
national community. Of course, both schemes represent historically contin-
gent particularisms and both have emancipatory as well as hegemonic po-
tentials. 
 Concerning the emotional potential, the scheme of patriotism seems 
much more powerful, which means that the eurosceptic discourse should be 
taken much more seriously than previously and that a a more detailed analy-
sis of the gap between the political elites and the citizens of individual states 
regarding the Euro-integration should be attempted. On the other hand, one 
should bear in mind that “affective investing is a contingent, historically de-
termined reality associated with the shifts in collective identification” 
(Stavrakakis, 2005: 86). This does not, however, mean overnight changes 
but a long process of restructuring the symbolic and the emotional aspects of 
identification, within the highly uncertain system. 
 Besides these common patterns of historical thinking we have tried to de-
termine how noticeable at the time of the research were the effects of the 
discontinuity in the cultural, social and political sense caused by the collapse 
of socialism, and manifested in a lower general coherence of historical con-
sciousness. While in Europe’s far east, mostly in the former Soviet republics, 
this effect was an expression of the ideological cleavage centred around the 
identification or the anti-identification with the old regime, in the Centraleu-
ropean post-socialist countries there has occurred a stronger identification 
with the new regime. The ideological conflicts centred around the primacy 
of the “return of the repressed” in the form of the nation or Europe. Such 
ideological structuring led to a higher coherence of historical consciousness 
in relation to the other clusters. It seems that social antagonisms transformed 
into agonisms28 among political adversaries within democratic pluralism can 
have an integrative effect on historical thinking and represent a significant 




27 It should not be forgotten that the idea of progressivism found its hegemonial expression 
in colonialism that almost always integrated the idea of backwardness into the notion of non-
Western societies and civilizations, or projected onto them the image of their own past, dump-
ing them into the same framework. By explaining the precolonial history of colonized peoples 
as a “tragic tale of wars, massacres and slavery” (Spurr, 1993: 34), colonialism utilized three 
concepts: humanity which requires universal development; the colonized, who need protection 
from their own ignorance and violence; and nature, which requires a wise utilization of its re-
sources (ibid.). This is, to say the least, a very clear example of an attempt to establish one’s 
own particularities as universal perceptions (cf. Laclau, 1995; Biti, 2000: 191). 
28 See e.g. Mouffe, 2000. In Croatia, on agonistic democracy see Cvijanović, 2004. 
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